Parenthood and cross-border surrogacy: what is 'new'? The ECtHR's first advisory opinion by Margaria, A.
COMMENTARY
Parenthood and Cross-Border
Surrogacy: What Is ‘New’? The
ECtHR’s First Advisory Opinion
ALICE MARGARIA*
Department of ‘Law and Anthropology’, Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology, Advokatenweg 36, 06114
Halle/Saale, Germany
I . INTRODUCTION
On 4 October 2019, the French Cour de Cassation ﬁnally put an end to the struggle
of Sylvie and Dominique Mennesson, and their twins who were born from a gesta-
tional surrogacy arrangement in California in 2000. It delivered a verdict that the fam-
ily had expected for 19 years: it validated the transcription into the French civil
registry of the foreign birth certiﬁcates that designate Mr and Mrs Mennesson as the
father and the mother of their daughters Fiorella and Valentina.1 This article focuses
on and examines a particularly decisive stage in the Mennessons’ crusade to justice:
the Advisory Opinion delivered by the European Court of Human Rights (‘the Court’
or ‘the ECtHR’) on the issue of recognition in domestic law of the legal relationship
between a child born through gestational surrogacy abroad and the intended mother.2
Against the background of the Court’s previous case law on surrogacy, this Opinion is
herein approached as a further opportunity to (re)consider what kind of link—ie
genetic, gestational, and social/intentional—makes someone a legal mother in the era
of reproductive technology. Being the ﬁrst of its kind, this Opinion offers the chance
to reﬂect also on the advisory mechanism itself, and what it can concretely add to the
Court’s jurisprudence.
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This article is divided into ﬁve sections. Section II introduces the Court’s involve-
ment in the area of cross-border surrogacy and the ‘new’ advisory mechanism available
under Protocol No 16.3 In Section III, the focus shifts on the ﬁrst Advisory Opinion
issued by the Grand Chamber, in particular on the context against which it originated.
Section IV is devoted to outlining the Opinion’s content, starting from the prelimi-
nary considerations made by the Court and followed by the latter’s response to the
two questions raised by the French Cour de Cassation. Sections V and VI include the
analytical core of this article and engage with two distinct yet interrelated aspects.
Section V reﬂects on the way the Opinion has been drafted and argues that it realises
a ‘good compromise’4 between the—often perceived as competing—approaches of
individual justice and constitutional justice. Despite its focus on the Mennesson case,
the Court offers indeed also some guidance on how to deal with future cases. The
content of such guidance is dissected in Section VI, which brings to the fore the ‘con-
struction’ of motherhood emerging from the Advisory Opinion. It will be concluded
that, despite remaining anchored to the idea that biology is to be privileged, this
Opinion reveals the Court’s awareness that being a mother—and more generally, a
parent—entails much more and sometimes something different from contributing
with one’s own genetic material to conception and/or gestating a pregnancy.
I I . THE ECTHR AND CROSS-BORDER SURROGACY: INTRODUCING
THE ‘NEW’ ADVISORY MECHANISM
Judges have been compared to ‘certiﬁed architects or engineers of the New Biology’.5
Bioethics is indeed an area in which the judiciary has long since played—and contin-
ues to play—a driving role in moulding the legal response to new social realities cre-
ated as a result of scientiﬁc progress.6 Owing to exigencies of time, written laws might
become largely obsolete or even lead to absurd outcomes when applied to circumstan-
ces that were unforeseeable at the time of drafting. New laws directed to regulate new
situations in contemporary society tend to be enacted with a delay and—whenever in
place—are often the result of compromises between diverging cultural, political, and
other social forces, thus eventually leaving room for judicial interpretation. It is there-
fore not surprising that, vis-a`-vis disputes concerning bioethical issues, judges are often
called to ‘ﬁll the void of indecisiveness’.7
This dynamic can be observed also within the domain of surrogacy and, more spe-
ciﬁcally, with respect to the controversial implications of cross-border arrangements
on the establishment of legal ties between the child and the intended parents. Apart
3 Protocol No 16 to the Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 2
October 2013 (entry into force on 1 August 2018) <https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Protocol_16_
ENG.pdf> accessed 19 October 2019.
4 J Jahn, ‘Normative Guidance from Strasbourg Through Advisory Opinions – Deprivation or Relocation of
the Convention’s Core?’ (2014) 74 Zeitschrift fu¨r ausla¨ndisches o¨fentliches Recht und Vo¨lkerrecht 821,
823.
5 GP Smith II, ‘Judicial Decisionmaking in the Age of Biotechnology’ (1999) 13 Notre Dame Journal of Law,
Ethics and Public Policy 93, 118.
6 C Byk, ‘Courts as Actors of Policy Making in Bioethics’ (2006) 17(1–2) Journal International de Bioe´tique
55.
7 Smith II (n 5) 94; A Margaria, Nuove Forme di Filiazione e Genitorialita`: Leggi e Giudici di Fronte alle Nuove
Realta` (Il Mulino 2018) 267–69.
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from troubling national judges in Europe and beyond, the issue of whether and how
parent–child relationships created through surrogacy arrangements abroad ought to be
legally recognised has also reached the ECtHR. In light of the signiﬁcant impact that its
decisions have had on the legislation of the Contracting States, the Court is viewed
as one of the most inﬂuential institutional actors not only in the creation of European
family law8 but also in the production of what has become known as ‘biolaw’.9
It follows from the ‘living instrument’ approach as one of its main interpretative doc-
trines that the Court has been called to reﬂect on the repercussions of social and techno-
logical progress on human rights in various ﬁelds—including that of reproductive
rights—on several occasions. Considering the sensitive moral and ethical issues that arise
‘against a background of fast-moving medical and scientiﬁc developments’,10 the Court
has generally acknowledged a particular need for restraint and proved overall hesitant to
interfere with national policies concerning bioethical issues.11 In relation to surrogacy-
related claims, however, the stance adopted by the Court has been less cautious than
expected. On the speciﬁc issue of the recognition of intended parenthood following sur-
rogacy, the Court has exercised its role of ‘shaping rights’12 through a double channel.
Not only has this issue been dealt within the Court’s contentious case law, but it has also
been at the core of its ﬁrst Advisory Opinion adopted under the new Protocol No 16.
This Protocol opens up the possibility for the ‘highest domestic courts’ to request
the Court to deliver an Advisory Opinion on ‘questions of principle relating to the in-
terpretation or application of the rights and freedoms deﬁned in the Convention or
the protocols thereto’.13 In the wake of the concern shown by Government leaders of
the Contracting States at the Brighton Conference,14 this advisory function has been
designed to improve the functioning and long-term effectiveness of the system of the
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) by pursuing two fundamental
objectives: enhancing the interaction between the Court and national courts15 and al-
leviating the Court’s caseload. The underlying rationale is that the advisory function
could serve as a ‘pre-emptive standard setting mechanism’16: if the Court succeeds in
providing guidance to national courts in interpreting and applying Convention stand-
ards, it is expected that a higher number of cases could be easily solved at the national
level.
8 JM Scherpe, European Family Law – The Present and the Future of European Family Law (Edward Elgar
Publishing 2016) 18.
9 L Poli, ‘Il primo (timido) parere consultivo della Corte europea dei diritti umani: ancora tante questioni
aperte sulla gestazione per altri’ (2019) 13(2) Diritti Umani e Diritto Internazionale 418, 420.
10 Knecht v Romania, No 10048/10, para 59, 2 October 2012.
11 For example, Vo v France [GC], No 53924/00, para 82, ECHR 2004-VIII; Parrillo v Italy [GC], No 46470/
11, para 180, ECHR 2015.
12 J Gerards and E Brems, ‘Introduction’ in J Gerards and E Brems (eds), Shaping Rights in the ECHR – The
Role of the European Court of Human Rights in Determining the Scope of Human Rights (CUP 2014) 1–3.
13 Protocol No 16 (n 3) art 1.
14 Brighton Declaration, ‘High Level Conference on the Future of the European Court of Human Rights’
(18–20 April 2012) <https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/2012_Brighton_FinalDeclaration_ENG.
pdf> accessed on 5 October 2019.
15 ibid, para 12(d); Protocol No 16 (n 3) Preamble.
16 K Dzehtsiarou and N O’Meara, ‘Advisory Opinion and the European Court of Human Rights: A Magic
Bullet for Dialogue and Docket-Control?’ (2014) 34(3) Legal Studies 444, 451.












ax Planck Institute for Social Anthropology user on 11 M
arch 2020
Apart from being the last Contracting Party to ratify Protocol No 16 and thus to
determine its entry into force, France is also the ﬁrst jurisdiction to have made use of
this procedure. In the face of a (further) legal initiative by Mr and Mrs Mennesson—
applicants of the well-known case against France decided by the ECtHR in 201417—
the French Cour de Cassation has consulted the Grand Chamber to obtain its views
on the recognition in domestic law of a legal parent–child relationship between a child
born through a gestational surrogacy arrangement abroad and the intended mother.
The following section will retrace the development of the Mennesson case from its
outset.
I I I . BACK TO THE ORIGINS: HOW DID IT ALL START?
France is among the European States where surrogacy is explicitly prohibited under
the law. In practice, national bans or restrictions on the use of surrogacy and other as-
sisted reproductive technologies (ARTs) have proved rather ineffective in preventing
intended parents from accessing the sought services and attaining their reproductive
goals abroad. The widespread discontent and prohibition of surrogacy—coupled with
the entrenchment of the principle mater semper certa est—has however resulted in the
so-called ‘new illegitimacy’ in Europe.18 Although turning domestic prohibitions into
a ‘dead letter’,19 resorting to foreign reproductive markets has indeed often exposed
intended parents to difﬁculties in having their parental status lawfully established
abroad recognised at home and, as a result, led to disparate treatment of children
born out of international surrogacy arrangements.
This Advisory Opinion originates from the story of one of these couples and their
twin daughters born through gestational surrogacy in California using the intended
father’s sperm and donor eggs. The twins had been identiﬁed in the USA as the chil-
dren of Mr and Mrs Mennesson. Once they arrived in France, they were allowed to
live together but nonetheless denied recognition of their parent–child relationships
as it would be contrary to public policy. After exhausting national remedies, the
Mennesson family lodged an application with the ECtHR. They submitted that the
children’s best interests had been disregarded and complained in particular of a breach
of their right to respect for private and family life guaranteed by Article 8 ECHR.
In its 2014 judgment, whilst ruling out any interference with the right to respect for
family life,20 the Court found that the refusal to recognise intended parenthood af-
fected the children’s ability to establish the essence of their identity—that includes
parentage—thus violating their right to respect for private life.21 Because of the bio-
logical connection existing between the children and their intended father, these con-
siderations assumed—in the Court’s view—a ‘special dimension’.22
17 Mennesson v France, No 65192/11, ECHR 2014 (extracts).
18 RF Storrow, ‘The Phantom Children of the Republic: International Surrogacy and the New Illegitimacy’
(2012) 20(3) Journal of Gender, Social Policy and the Law 561, 565.
19 BC Van Beers, ‘Is Europe “Giving in to Baby Markets?” Reproductive Tourism and the Gradual Erosion of
Existing Legal Limits to Reproductive Markets’ (2015) 23(1) Medical Law Review 103, 105.
20 Mennesson (n 17) paras 87–94.
21 ibid, para 96.
22 ibid, para 100. See also Labassee v France, No 65941/11, 26 June 2014; Foulon and Bouvet v France, Nos
9063/14 and 10410/14, 21 July 2016; Laborie v France, No 44024/13, 19 January 2017.
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This ruling has been described as ‘a watershed moment for the regulation of inter-
national surrogacy in Europe’23 in light of its immediate effect on domestic law. In
France, the Cour de Cassation tempered its position allowing for the registration of a
foreign birth certiﬁcate into the French civil register, unless evidence suggests that the
document is irregular, falsiﬁed and that the facts recorded do not reﬂect biological re-
ality.24 The recognition of intended parenthood became therefore possible in so far as
the birth certiﬁcate designated the intended father as the child’s father where he had a
genetic connection with the child. Intended motherhood was, however, left out in the
cold. The Cour de Cassation reiterated its commitment to the principle mater semper
certa est and, therefore, parturition as the only criterion to determine legal mother-
hood.25 Only 2 years later, it clariﬁed that the intended mother could nonetheless
seek to adopt the child, provided that the statutory requirements were met and adop-
tion was in the child’s best interests.26
The case ofMennesson came again under the spotlight in 2018, when the applicants
took advantage of the recently established procedure that allows for the review of
decisions issued by the Cour de Cassation that have been declared in violation of the
ECHR by the Strasbourg judges. On 16 February 2018, the French Civil Judgments
Review Court accepted their request for reviewing the previous refusal to register the
foreign birth certiﬁcates. Whilst it considered the issue of the recognition of the bio-
logical father’s parental relationship with his twin daughters settled, the Cour de
Cassation expressed doubts as to the degree of the margin of appreciation left to the
States with respect to the parental status of the intended mother. Hence, the request
to clarify the effects and consequences of the ECtHR’s previous jurisprudence on the
position of the intended mother through the following two questions:
1. By refusing to enter in the register of births, marriages and deaths the details
of the birth certiﬁcate of a child born abroad as the result of a gestational surro-
gacy arrangement, in so far as the certiﬁcate designates the ‘intended mother’ as
the ‘legal mother’, while accepting registration in so far as the certiﬁcate designa-
tes the ‘intended father’, who is the child’s biological father, is a State Party over-
stepping its margin of appreciation under Article 8 of the European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms? In this con-
nection should a distinction be drawn according to whether or not the child was
conceived using the eggs of the ‘intended mother’?
2. In the event of an answer in the afﬁrmative to either of the two questions
above, would the possibility for the intended mother to adopt the child of her
spouse, the biological father, this being a means of establishing the legal mother-
child relationship, ensure compliance with the requirements of Article 8 of the
Convention?27
23 C Fenton-Glynn, ‘International Surrogacy Before the European Court of Human Rights’ (2017) 13(3)
Journal of Private International Law 546, 555.
24 Cour de Cassation, Assemble´e ple´nie`re, Nos 619 and 620 of 3 July 2015.
25 Cour de Cassation, 1e`re Chambre Civile, Nos 824–827 of 5 July 2017.
26 ibid.
27 Advisory Opinion (n 2) para 9.
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IV. THE CONTENT OF THE OPINION
A. Preliminary Considerations: Setting the Boundaries
Before addressing the two questions posed by the Cour de Cassation, the Grand
Chamber makes some preliminary considerations in order to delimit the boundaries
of its advisory function and, more speciﬁcally, of its Advisory Opinion. The Court
identiﬁes three sets of limits. First, it explains that the scope of the procedure is ‘not
to transfer the dispute to the Court’,28 but rather to provide guidance on issues related
to the Convention to the requesting court or tribunal when settling the case pending
before them.29 It follows that the Court does not engage with the facts of the case, as
it would do under its contentious jurisdiction, and does not rule on the outcome of
domestic proceedings.30 Rather, as clariﬁed by the Court, it falls on the requesting na-
tional court or tribunal to draw conclusions from the Grand Chamber’s Opinion and
to solve the matter pending before them.31
Secondly, according to the Court, the Opinion must be limited to ‘points that are
directly connected to the proceedings pending at the domestic level’.32 The Grand
Chamber anticipates therefore that its Opinion will not deal with situations ensuing
from procreative paths different from that undertaken by Mr and Mrs Mennesson.
More speciﬁcally, it formally excludes situations involving traditional surrogacy
arrangements—that is when the child was conceived using the eggs of the surrogate
mother33—or arrangements involving the genetic material of the intended mother,34
from the scope of its Opinion. Thirdly, and ﬁnally, the Court takes the time to specify
that its Opinion will not address either the right to respect for family life of the chil-
dren and intended parents or the latter’s right to respect for private life.35 At least
prima facie, therefore, the approach taken by the Grand Chamber seems to be that of
restricting its views to the elements that appear strictly necessary to decide the case
pending before the Cour de Cassation.
B. Issue 1: Recognition?
The ﬁrst issue raised by the Cour de Cassation concerned whether Article 8 required
national authorities to recognise the legal relationship between the intended mother
and the child born from surrogacy lawfully established abroad. To address this ques-
tion, the Grand Chamber identiﬁes two factors as particularly weighty: the child’s best
interests and the scope of the margin of appreciation enjoyed by State Parties.36 With
respect to the former, the Advisory Opinion reiterates that the detrimental impact of
non-recognition is not limited to the parents, but affects also the children, who are
consequently placed in a position of legal uncertainty regarding their identity within
28 ibid, para 25; Explanatory Report to Protocol No 16 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms, para 11.
29 ibid.
30 Advisory Opinion (n 2) para 25.
31 ibid.
32 ibid, para 26.
33 ibid, para 29.
34 ibid, para 28.
35 ibid, para 30.
36 ibid, para 37.
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society.37 The Court explains that the lack of recognition of the relationship between
a child born through a surrogacy agreement abroad and the intended mother might
be disadvantageous in many respects: children might be denied their intended moth-
er’s nationality; they might experience difﬁculties in remaining in their intended moth-
er’s country of residence as well as in preserving their relationship with their mother
in case of parental separation; their inheritance rights might be curtailed; and, ﬁnally,
they might be left with no protection in case the mother does not take care of them.38
Whilst acknowledging the ‘risks of abuse’39 that surrogacy arrangements trigger
as well as the importance of the right to know one’s origins, the Court is of the
view that:
the general and absolute impossibility of obtaining recognition of the relation-
ship between a child born through a surrogacy arrangement entered into abroad
and the intended mother is incompatible with the child’s best interests, which
require at a minimum that each situation be examined in the light of the particu-
lar circumstances of the case.40
Moving onto discussing the margin of appreciation enjoyed by the State, this Opinion
has been effectively described as ‘a child of its time’.41 In the so-called ‘age of subsidi-
arity’42—and, moreover, given the framing of the question by the Cour de Cassation—
it is not surprising that the margin of appreciation is given a central role in the
Advisory Opinion. On the wake of its previous judgments, the Court recalls that—on
the basis of its comparative-law survey—there is no European consensus on whether
intended parenthood following surrogacy ought to be recognised.43 This situation
would, in line with the Court’s practice, lead to a wide margin of appreciation.44
The Court concludes, however, that the margin ought to be reduced because the issue
at stake involves particularly important facets of an individual’s identity as well as ‘es-
sential aspects of the (children’s) private life’.45
Thus, given the requirement of the child’s best interests and the narrow margin of
appreciation afforded to Contracting States in such situations, the Court is of the
opinion that Article 8 ought to be read as requiring domestic law to allow for the
recognition of the parent–child relationship lawfully established abroad between the
child and the intended mother, who is designated as the ‘legal mother’ on the birth
certiﬁcate.46 Prior to addressing the second question posed by the Cour de Cassation,
37 ibid, para 39 referring toMennesson(n 17) para 99.
38 ibid, para 40.
39 ibid, para 41.
40 ibid, para 42.
41 L Lavrysen, ‘The Mountain Gave Birth to a Mouse: The First Advisory Opinion under Protocol No, 16’
(Strasbourg Observers, 14 April 2019) <https://strasbourgobservers.com/2019/04/24/the-mountain-gave-
birth-to-a-mouse-the-ﬁrst-advisory-opinion-under-protocol-no-16/> accessed on 20 October 2019.
42 R Spano, ‘Universality or Diversity of Human Rights? Strasbourg in the Age of Subsidiarity’ (2014) 14(3)
Human Rights Law Review 487.
43 Advisory Opinion (n 2) para 43.
44 ibid.
45 ibid, para 45.
46 ibid, para 46.
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the Court ﬁnds it important to add that, in the hypothetical scenario where the
intended mother is genetically linked to the child, the need to provide for such recog-
nition ‘applies with even greater force’.47 In so doing, it ends up partially ignoring its
own disclaimer (Section IVA) by providing some guidance—even if through an obiter
dictum—on a situation that is different from the one pending before the national
court.
C. Issue 2: What Kind of Recognition?
Having clariﬁed that the right to respect for private life of the children born abroad
from gestational surrogacy entails the possibility for the intended mother–child tie to
be legally recognised, the Court goes on to examine the quo modo of such recognition.
Whilst stressing that the uncertainty surrounding the children’s status should be ‘as
short-lived as possible’,48 the Court argues that the choice of means by which to en-
able recognition falls within the State’s margin of appreciation.49 This conclusion is
grounded on the lack of a European consensus also on this issue, and on the fact that
the children’s identity is perceived as ‘less directly at stake’50 when the issue is how to
implement the duty of recognition. In the Court’s view, therefore, Article 8 does not
require the recognition of the mother–child relationship ab initio, but ‘at the latest
when it has become a practical reality’51 based on the assessment of national authori-
ties. As a result, the Court does not consider the entry of the foreign birth certiﬁcate
into the register of births, marriages, and deaths as the only acceptable form of recog-
nition.52 Adoption by the intended mother represents—in the Court’s opinion—a
valid alternative, provided that national legislation enables a decision to be taken
‘promptly and effectively, in accordance with the child’s best interests’.53
As summarised by Lavrysen, therefore, the sole obligation that the Opinion pre-
scribes is to provide ‘access to an effective procedural mechanism’54 that allows for
the recognition of the legal relationship between the child and the intended mother, if
this is in line with the assessment of the child’s best interests in light of the circum-
stances of the case. The guidance offered by the Grand Chamber—whose ‘limited’55
scope and potential effects in practice had been questioned56—has however proved
sufﬁcient to put an end to the legal battle of the Mennesson family. On 4 October
2019, the Cour de Cassation decided in favour of the recognition of the legal relation-
ship between Mrs Mennesson and her twin daughters.57 Most importantly, it ruled
out adoption as an unsatisfactory option in this speciﬁc ‘case that had been ongoing
47 ibid, para 47.
48 ibid, para 49.
49 ibid, para 51.
50 ibid.
51 ibid, para 52.
52 ibid, para 53.
53 ibid, para 55. See also C and E v France (Dec.), Nos 1462/18 and 17348/18, 12 December 2019.
54 Lavrysen (n 41).
55 ibid.
56 For example, AM Lecis Cocco Ortu, ‘L’Obbligo di Riconoscimento della Genitorialita` Intenzionale tra
Diritto Interno e CEDU: Riﬂessioni a Partire dal Primo Parere Consultivo della Corte EDU su GPA e
Trascrizioni’ 2019 (1) Genius 68, 80.
57 Cour de Cassation (n 1).
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for more than 15 years’,58 and held that the recognition of the foreign birth certiﬁcates
that designate Mrs Mennesson as the ‘legal mother’ of the twins can no longer be
denied.
V. DRAFTING TECHNIQUES: A ‘GOOD COMPROMISE’
Having outlined the content of the Opinion, this section scrutinises the drafting tech-
niques used by the Court with the view of examining the actual reach of its interven-
tion. International human rights law does not offer a ‘univocal answer’59 and ‘may be
interpreted to allow both permissive and prohibitionist national approaches to the
regulation of international surrogacy’.60 The complexity of the human rights discourse
in the domain of surrogacy is visible also in the ECtHR jurisprudence, where the im-
pact of cross-border arrangements on legal parenthood has given rise to diverging
views within the Court. Particularly emblematic is the reversal of the Chamber’s deci-
sion by the Grand Chamber in the case of Paradiso and Campanelli v Italy. In this
case, the child—born out of a surrogacy arrangement in Russia—had been placed for
adoption in light of a DNA test showing no biological connection with the intended
parents. Whilst the Chamber considered the child’s removal from Mr Paradiso and
Mrs Campanelli in breach of their right to respect for family life,61 the Grand
Chamber found it justiﬁed by the need to prevent an illegal situation put in place by
the intended parents from being legalised and, therefore, compatible with Article 8.62
Not only have the Chamber and the Grand Chamber reached opposite outcomes re-
lying on substantially different reasoning; they have both issued judgments that, far
from being endorsed by all judges sitting on the Court, have given rise to concurring
and/or dissenting opinions.
Disagreement is a possibility also under Article 4(2) of Protocol No 16: ‘If the ad-
visory opinion does not represent, in whole or in part, the unanimous opinion of the
judges, any judge shall be entitled to deliver a separate opinion.’ Despite so, the
Grand Chamber did not—in its advisory capacities—take advantage of this opportu-
nity. Possibly motivated by the desire to strengthen its authority, the Court delivered
a ﬁrst, unanimous Advisory Opinion. At the same time, however, if regard is given to
the way the Opinion is drafted, the Court seems to hide the inevitable difﬁculties to
express views on a particularly controversial issue—like that at stake—behind proce-
dural caution. Despite acknowledging that the value of Advisory Opinions consists
also ‘in providing national courts with guidance on questions of principle relating to
the Convention applicable in similar cases’,63 the Court then chooses—at least for-
mally—to tailor its reasoning around the speciﬁc case. In addition to the boundaries
set in its preliminary considerations (Section IVA), the Court does not miss a chance
to remind us of the peculiarities of theMennesson case and to state that it will ‘limit its
58 ibid, para 19.
59 Y Ergas, ‘Thinking “Through” Human Rights: The Need for a Human Rights Perspective with Respect to
the Regulation of Cross-border Reproductive Surrogacy’ in K Trimmings and P Beaumont (eds),
International Surrogacy Agreements: Legal Regulation at the International Level (Hart 2013) 428.
60 ibid 431.
61 Paradiso and Campanelli v Italy, No 25358/12, 27 January 2015.
62 Paradiso and Campanelli v Italy [GC], No 25358/12, 24 January 2017.
63 Advisory Opinion (n 2) para 26.
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answer accordingly’,64 also when addressing the two issues raised by the Cour de
Cassation. The Court’s multiple attempts to restrict the scope of its Opinion can,
therefore, be read as an externalisation of its awareness of the delicate complexity of
the issue at stake: not just in the merits (ie ethical and moral dimensions of surro-
gacy), but also as far as the Court’s relationship with national authorities is concerned.
On the one hand, the prudent attitude shining through the Opinion is in line with
the requirement set by Article 1(2) of Protocol No 16, according to which an
Advisory Opinion can be requested ‘only in the context of a case pending’ before the
requesting national court or tribunal. On the other hand, however, it has been rightly
pointed out that there is no provision in the Protocol that states that the Court has to
similarly conﬁne its response to such context.65 The Court’s choice to restrict its views
to the context of theMennesson case has been considered even ‘at odds with’66 Protocol
No 16’s general aim of to provide guidance on questions of principle related to the
interpretation and application of the Convention.67 The idea underlying this critique
is that, if the Advisory mechanism is truly expected to reduce the Court’s caseload,
the ECHR system would rather beneﬁt from Opinions that transcend the speciﬁc case
and anticipate foreseeable difﬁculties that might emerge in similar future cases.
While sharing the above concerns, it is herein argued that the Court’s ﬁrst
Advisory Opinion ought to be appreciated as it contributes, in its current form, to
realising the Court’s ‘twin role’.68 In other words, it provides—thus showing that it is
possible—a ‘good compromise’69 between the Court’s long predominant duty to de-
liver individual justice and the ‘constitutional role’ Protocol No 16 aims to strengthen.
These two functions have been often perceived as being in tension. On the one hand,
the individual justice approach is premised on the view that the right of individual pe-
tition represents the core of the Convention system, the ‘Crown jewel of the
Convention’.70 The Court’s ‘primary’ duty consists therefore in deciding each applica-
tion on a case-by-case basis with the purpose of ‘provid(ing) individual relief’ to those
affected.71 On the other hand, the notion of ‘constitutional justice’ in the ECHR con-
text has been ﬁrst used by the Court’s then President, Luzius Wildhaber. He envisaged
a ‘constitutional future’72 for the ECtHR, where the latter would adjudicate ‘essentially
public-policy issues’,73 focus on ‘decisions of “principle”, decisions which create juris-
prudence’,74 thus developing the standards and clarifying the substantive content of
64 ibid, para 36.
65 Lavrysen (n 41).
66 ibid.
67 Explanatory Report (n 28) para 11.
68 Brighton Declaration (n 14) para 35(c).
69 Jahn (n 4) 823.
70 J Christoffersen, ‘Individual and Constitutional Justice: Can the Power Balance of Adjudication be
Reversed?’ in J Christoffersen and MR Madsen (eds), The European Court of Human Rights between Law
and Politics (OUP 2011) 182.
71 Konstantin Markin v Russia [GC], No 30078/06, para 89, ECHR 2012 (extracts).
72 L Wildhaber, ‘A Constitutional Future for the European Court of Human Rights’ (2002) 23(5–7) Human
Rights Law Journal 161.
73 ibid 163.
74 L Wildhaber, ‘The Role of the European Court of Human Rights: An Evaluation’ (2004) Mediterranean
Journal of Human Rights 9, 28.
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the ECHR. The Court itself, when discussing how Protocol No 16 would enhance
the Court’s ‘constitutional’ role, explains that: ‘Advisory opinions provide an opportu-
nity to develop the underlying principles of law in a manner that will speak to the legal
systems of all the Contracting Parties. . . . The procedure would thus allow the Court
to adopt a larger number of rulings on questions of principle and to set clearer stand-
ards for human rights protection in Europe.’75
The most tangible evidence of the ‘good compromise’ set by the Court’s ﬁrst
Advisory Opinion between these two approaches to justice is paragraph 47. Despite
observing (once again) that national proceedings do not concern a situation where
the child born from surrogacy has been conceived with the eggs of the intended
mother, the Court is unable to resist the temptation to comment on that scenario
too: ‘the need to provide a possibility of recognition of the legal relationship between
the child and the intended mother applies with even greater force in such a case’.
Possibly helped by the way the Cour de Cassation framed its ﬁrst question, the Court
seizes the occasion to go ‘hors du cadre’,76 and to express its views on a situation that
is different from the Mennesson case, yet likely to emerge in future cases. In so doing,
the Court shows itself willing not only to engage in a ‘cercle vertueux du dialogue’77
with national courts but also to take up a role of ‘normative guidance’78 that goes be-
yond the single case. More speciﬁcally, it seems that the Court uses its advisory juris-
diction also to induce general principles from the speciﬁc case pending before the
national court. In this particular instance, the Court’s role of guidance translates into
expressing its normative visions on the relevant factors to determine legal mother-
hood following surrogacy. In so doing, the Grand Chamber centres its Opinion on
the Mennesson case, whilst still giving Contracting States ‘some pointers’79 for regula-
tion. What can be learned in view of future cases is examined in the following section.
VI . MOTHERHOOD AND SURROGACY
Regardless of their diverse approaches to surrogacy, legislative frameworks across
Europe follow the rule mater semper certa est to deﬁne who is a mother. In other
words, legal motherhood is determined according to the traditional biological/gesta-
tional criteria: the woman who is pregnant and gives birth to the child is treated as the
child’s mother. The attribution of the paternal status is governed by a different pre-
sumption—the so-called ‘marital presumption’—that identiﬁes the husband of a
woman giving birth to a child as the father of the child. In practice, however, surrogacy
entails something different. The woman who gestates the child is not the same as the
woman who raises the child. Moreover, the man who acts as a father towards the child
75 ECtHR Reﬂection Paper on the Proposal to Extend the Court’s Advisory Jurisdiction, para 5.
76 P Deumier and H Fulchiron, ‘Premie`re demande d’avis a` la CEDH: vers une jurisprudence ‘augmente´e’’?’
(2019) (4) Recueil Dalloz 228, 231.
77 AS Brun-Wauthier and G Vial, ‘Gestation pour Autrui: Le Cercle Vertueux du Dialogue des Juges – A pro-
pos de l’avis consultatif de la CourEDH du 10 avril 2019’ (2019) 22 Revue des Droits et Liberte´s
Fondamentaux <http://www.revuedlf.com/personnes-famille/gestation-pour-autrui-le-cercle-vertueux-du-
dialogue-des-juges-a-propos-de-lavis-consultatif-de-la-couredh-du-10-avril-2019/> accessed 7 October
2019.
78 Jahn (n 4) 829.
79 This expression is taken from T Murphy, ‘Judging Bioethics and Human Rights’ in MK Land and JD
Aronson (eds), New Technologies for Human Rights Law and Practice (CUP 2018) 87.
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is not the husband of the surrogate mother. As such, surrogacy provides legal
actors—and society as whole—with precious opportunities of reﬂection as it ques-
tions traditional understandings of who is perceived to be a ‘parent’, especially a
‘mother’.
I have argued elsewhere that, if regard is given to the impact of the wider ARTs-
related jurisprudence on fatherhood, the Court has only partially seized the occasion
to re-think what makes someone a legal father in present-day family realities.80 The
Court has indeed started to value the father’s intentions and actual involvement in the
child’s life, but only if they are accompanied by other, ‘conventional’ features—in
primis, biology.81 In Mennesson, the biological link between the intended father and
his daughters was seemingly the ‘turning point’82: the importance of recognising bio-
logical parentage formed indeed a signiﬁcant part of the Court’s reasoning.83 A biolog-
ical understanding of fatherhood runs also through the Grand Chamber’s decision in
Paradiso and Campanelli that, although ﬁnding no violation, ends up reinforcing the
previous ruling. The purely social nature of the ties between the intended parents
and the child constituted one—or possibly the main—obstacle to qualifying their re-
lationship as ‘family life’.84 The ‘radical inﬂuence’85 of biological unrelatedness went
even further to broaden the width of the margin of appreciation enjoyed by the State
and, eventually, to entail a rather loose proportionality analysis.86
If the Court’s contentious jurisprudence concerning surrogacy contributes to ‘con-
structing’ a speciﬁc image of the ‘father’, the Advisory Opinion brings an interesting
contribution to the debate on motherhood. It is certainly remarkable that the Grand
Chamber interprets the children’s right to respect for their private life as entailing the
possibility of recognition to the advantage of the social ties existing between the
intended mother and her daughters born from surrogacy. In so doing, the Court
moves beyond the traditional biological/gestational understanding of motherhood
and acknowledges the provision of care as another relevant dimension of ‘being a
mother’ and, more generally, ‘being a parent’.
Reading Article 8 as demanding a procedure that allows for formal recognition of
intended motherhood in domestic law, however, does not amount to place it on an
equal footing to biological parenthood. This becomes particularly clear from the
Court’s response to the second question raised by the Cour de Cassation. The tena-
cious hold of biology is visible in two respects. First, in the above-mentioned para-
graph 47, the Court seems to suggest that the intended mother that has also a genetic
connection with the child would be even more entitled than Mrs Mennesson to
80 A Margaria, The Construction of Fatherhood: The Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (CUP
2019) ch 3.
81 ibid 69.
82 L Bracken, ‘Assessing the Best Interests of the Child in Cases of Cross-border Surrogacy: Inconsistency in
the Strasbourg Approach?’ (2017) 39(3) Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 368, 373.
83 Mennesson (n 17) para 100.
84 Paradiso and Campanelli (n 62) para 157.
85 M Nı´ Shu´illeabha´in, ‘Surrogacy, System Shopping, and Article 8 of the European Convention on Human
Rights’ (2019) 33 International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 104, 108.
86 Paradiso and Campanelli (n 62) para 195.
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obtain the recognition of her legal tie with the child born from surrogacy. Secondly,
the Court does not impose speciﬁc means of recognition for intended motherhood.
Differently from biological fatherhood that has to be recognised ab initio through the
entry into the register of births, marriages, and deaths of the details recorded on the
foreign birth certiﬁcate, States are left to decide how to fulﬁl their obligation of recog-
nition vis-a`-vis intended motherhood. Hence, whilst strengthening the position of the
intended mother, this Advisory Opinion does—at the same time—reiterate the privi-
leged role conferred on biology in establishing legal parenthood.
A ﬁnal aspect of curiosity is that, possibly helped by the facts of the case at stake,
motherhood is herein constructed as a derivative of fatherhood. Before addressing the
ﬁrst issue, the Court observes that the question at stake ‘explicitly includes the factual
element of a father with a biological link to the child in question’ and ‘it will limit its
answer accordingly’.87 The Court ﬁnds it therefore signiﬁcant to stress that Mrs
Mennesson’s parentage arose in the context of a marriage with the biological father.
This aspect of the Advisory Opinion is noteworthy because, traditionally, it has been
fatherhood to be understood as a mediated relationship, rather than as an autono-
mous, direct connection between the father and his child. The ‘marital presumption’
is emblematic of the crucial function that marriage has long played in connecting men
to their children. Here, by way of contrast, legal fatherhood is assigned by virtue of bi-
ology, and the (marital) connection between the intended parents emerges as one of
the factors that make the relationship between the intended mother and her daughters
worthy of legal recognition. In other words, the ‘privilege’ of recognition is extended
to the intended mother not only as a result of her involvement in the children’s lives
but also in her capacity as the wife of the biological father.
An interesting question—potentially for the future—is therefore whether the
Court would be willing to adopt the same approach vis-a`-vis surrogacy arrangements
where the intended mother has a genetic link with the child and/or she is the sole
intended parent to have such connection. In the latter case, will the provision of
care—and the father’s marriage with the mother—be considered sufﬁcient to grant
the paternal status to the intended father in a context where biology remains a deﬁn-
ing feature of legal fatherhood? Will the biological connection existing between the
intended mother and the child constitute a sufﬁcient link in a context where ‘the re-
productive experience’ continues to be perceived as a crucial aspect of motherhood?88
In conclusion, the Court conﬁrms but, to a certain extent, also questions the pri-
macy of biological parenthood by reading Article 8 as imposing the obligation to en-
able the recognition of intended motherhood also notwithstanding the rule mater
semper certa est. This Opinion adds therefore, if not a new block,89 some clarity to the
Court’s previous jurisprudence on surrogacy: the recognition of the legal relationship
between the child and the intended mother is in the child’s best interests because not
only biological truth but also relational and emotional aspects contribute to develop-
ing one’s private life and personal identity.
87 Advisory Opinion (n 2) para 36.
88 For example, Re TT and YY [2019] EWHC 1823 (Fam).
89 Nı´ Shu´illeabha´in (n 85) 108–09.
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VII . CONCLUDING REMARKS
Advisory Opinions are not binding. Yet, ‘they . . . form part of the case-law of the
Court, alongside its judgments and decisions’.90 The interpretative elements offered
by the Court under its advisory jurisdiction are therefore analogous in their effects to
the interpretation of the Convention adopted by the Court in its judgments and deci-
sions. As such, Advisory Opinions represent an additional vehicle through which the
Court exercises its ‘expressive powers’.91 In the case at issue, the effects of the
Advisory Opinion do not stop at advising the Cour de Cassation on how to deal with
the national proceedings pending before it, but can be read as going as far as to make
statements—and thus to provide guidance—on what elements and values are more
important than others in making someone a legal mother. In the Court’s view, it is
not just biology and gestation that counts. (Legal) motherhood is—as obvious as it
might seem—also about taking care of the child.
The Court’s normative guidance appears particularly welcome in the context of
surrogacy and, more generally, when faced with questions at the intersection of family
law and bioethics. Despite the progressive emergence of common trends, family law
continues to be an introverted subject as it remains particularly open to inﬂuence by
moral, cultural, religious, social, and political factors92—especially so when it has to
grapple with advances in medical science. In the area of international surrogacy
arrangements, many scholars have advocated and concrete efforts have been deployed
towards the adoption of an international regulation to address the far-reaching conse-
quences that cross-border reproduction can have on the human lives and rights of all
those involved.93 The Court’s Advisory Opinion—as well as its contentious jurispru-
dence—ﬁts therefore into this wider, supra-national endeavour to identify ‘common
solutions to avoid limping legal parentage’.94 At the same time, however, it is impor-
tant not to lose sight of the other side of the coin and, therefore, to ask ourselves how
far and how fast it is advisable and desirable for the Court to go in such a controversial
arena. In its ﬁrst Advisory Opinion, it is by reading Article 8 as implying the possibility
for recognition, but not of a speciﬁc type, that the Court manages to advance the in-
terpretation of the Convention as a ‘living instrument’ whilst respecting (some) na-
tional variations.
90 Explanatory Report (n 28) para 27.
91 K L~ohmus, Caring Autonomy: European Human Rights Law and The Challenge of Individualism (CUP 2015)
2–3.
92 W Mu¨ller-Freienfels, ‘The Uniﬁcation of Family Law’ (1968) 16(1/2) American Journal of Comparative
Law, 175, 175.
93 For example, K Trimmings and P Beaumont, ‘The European Court of Human Rights in Paradiso and
Campanelli v Italy and the Way Forward for Regulating Cross-border Surrogacy’ (2017) University of
Aberdeen Working Paper No 2017/3 <https://www.abdn.ac.uk/law/documents/CPIL%20Working
%20Paper%20No%202017_3.pdf> accessed 19 October 2019; R Keating, ‘Left in Limbo: The Need to
Regulate International Surrogacy Agreements’ (2014) 17 Trinity College Law Review 64, 91–92.
94 Hague Conference on Private International Law, Report of the Experts’ Group on the Parentage/Surrogacy
Project (Meeting of 28 January–1 February 2019) (2019) pt 2 <https://assets.hcch.net/docs/55032fc1-
bec1-476b-8933-865d6ce106c2.pdf> accessed 20 October 2019.
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